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In 1960, twelve-year-old Howard Dully endured a transorbital 
lobotomy, involving the insertion of a surgical instrument through his 
eye socket to sever connections between his frontal cortex and the rest 
of his brain. In 1996, Jill Bolte Taylor, a brain anatomist, witnessed her 
own disorientation when she suffered a stroke one morning as she pre-
172 BRaIN MeMoIRS, NeURoSCIeNCe, aND THe SelF
pared to go to work. In 2004, alix Kates Shulman awoke in the middle 
of the night to find her husband unconscious after having fallen from 
the loft bed in the remote coastal cabin she used as a writing retreat. 
In 2006, Siri Hustvedt felt and watched her body convulse, her arms 
flail, and her skin discolor while she delivered a eulogy at a memo-
rial for her father. These shocking experiences frightened Dully, Taylor, 
Shulman, and Hustvedt—but they also fascinated them—because they 
made philosophical or abstract questions about the connections between 
body, mind, self, and world physically and experientially concrete. 
all four have written brain memoirs that document their suffering and 
fascination, chronicles of the push-pull between their selves and their 
brains. In the case of all four writers, the relations between self and 
brain they chronicle aren’t simply changed by brain disease or injury, 
but are continuously changing in reaction to altered brain function and 
the writers’ living responses to their physiological conditions—includ-
ing, crucially, writing about them.
of course, there is a long tradition of autobiographical writing 
that chronicles mind-body relationships and their implications for self-
hood, including the work of augustine, Montaigne, Thomas De Quincey, 
Marcel Proust, and Virginia Woolf. Brain memoirs can be understood as 
the most recent incarnation of this longstanding tradition, though their 
explicit focus on the brain—and on the writer as organism—is more 
pointed than that of their predecessors. like Siri Hustvedt’s The Shaking 
Woman (2009), some of these recent memoirs chronicle the lived experi-
ence of their authors’ “neurodiversity,” including Kay Redfield Jamison’s 
An Unquiet Mind: A Memoir of Moods and Madness (1995), Temple Gran-
din’s Thinking in Pictures (1996) and Emergence (1996), Daniel Tammet’s 
Born on a Blue Day (2007), Tim Page’s Parallel Play (2009), and lauren 
Slater’s Prozac Diary (1999) and Lying (2001). like Charles Dully’s My 
Lobotomy (2007), some chronicle the aftermath or recovery from brain 
illness or injury, including Jill Bolte Taylor’s My Stroke of Insight (2010) 
and Jean-Dominique Bauby’s The Diving Bell and the Butterfly (1998). 
like alix Kates Shulman’s To Love What Is (2009), some tell stories of 
caregivers or family living with a person suffering from brain injury 
or disease, including David B’s Epileptic (2006), Jonathan Franzen’s es-
say “My Father’s Brain” (2001), and John Bayley’s Elegy for Iris (1999). 
others tell pharmacological or addiction stories about the capacity of 
drugs to alter body chemistry to shape the contours of a personality, 
including Caroline Knapp’s Drinking: A Love Story (1997), Bill Clegg’s 
Portrait of an Addict as a Young Man (2010), elizabeth Wurtzel’s More, 
Now, Again (2002), and Stephen elliot’s The Adderall Diaries (2009). Still 
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others investigate the distinctive features or idiosyncrasies of so-called 
“neurotypicals,” including Steven Johnson’s Mind Wide Open (2005) and 
Douglas Hofstadter’s I Am a Strange Loop (2008).
Brain memoirs do not let their writers—or readers—forget that they 
are organisms whose lives are shaped to a large degree by accidents of 
physiology, culture, family, and circumstance. They confront accidents 
by crafting a sense of agency that’s nuanced enough to account for 
what’s beyond their control. This is where their distinctive cultural 
work begins. of course, brain memoirs come in a broad spectrum 
of forms and with a wide variety of agendas. Nonetheless, there are 
some common denominators. Broadly speaking, brain memoirs make 
at least five significant contributions to culture—in varying degrees for 
each particular memoir: (1) they enable their writers to gain a sense 
of agency or control in the face of the “accidents” that shape lives, 
including the accidents of genes, disease, or physical injury; (2) they 
offer much-needed solace and information to readers who suffer in 
ways similar to the writer as well as the loved ones and caretakers 
who support them; (3) they provide detailed, first-person accounts of 
neurological difference that have the potential to inform and influence 
brain research and clinical practice; (4) they renew and invigorate 
philosophical debates about mind and body, qualia, memory, and 
relationships between self and narrative; (5) they develop narrative 
strategies for representing the complexities of the minds and bodies 
of their authors. 
although the ostensible subject of brain memoirs is the writer’s 
particular subjective experience of an illness, difference, disorder, or 
injury, very often these memoirs become vehicles for large questions 
about the relationship between brain and self. Two classics in what’s 
becoming a crowded genre illustrate this nicely. In An Unquiet Mind: 
A Memoir of Moods and Madness, Kay Redfield Jamison acknowledges 
a problem with writing about her bipolar disorder that is central for 
any memoir that tells the story of the relation between brain, mind, 
and self: “I have become fundamentally and deeply skeptical that 
anyone who does not have this illness can truly understand it” (172). 
Similarly, in Thinking in Pictures: My Life with Autism, Temple Grandin 
asserts, “I am frustrated by the fact that some teachers and therapists 
still do not recognize the importance of sensory over sensibility. It must 
be difficult for them to imagine a totally different way of perceiving 
the world” (82). 
If Jamison and Grandin have written memoirs that are classics in 
the genre, oliver Sacks is its most influential progenitor. With his case 
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histories and autobiographical writing, Sacks created unlikely best sellers 
out of nonfiction neurological narratives. Since the publication of The 
Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat a quarter century ago, there have 
been rapid advances in brain science, due largely to brain scanning 
technologies like PeT, CaT, and fMRI. During that period, numerous 
memoirists have emerged to tell stories about how their anomalous 
brains have shaped their lives and selves. These memoirists all share 
Sacks’s penchant for using narrative to approximate the impossible: 
the revelation of another person’s conscious experience. If I can riff 
on the title of Thomas Nagel’s 1974 thought experiment, “What Is It 
like to Be a Bat?,” these memoirs ask, “What is it like to be autistic, 
epileptic, or ‘locked in,’ to suffer from profound amnesia, addiction, 
or alzheimer’s—or, for that matter, to be neurotypical?” Where many 
traditional memoirs take selfhood for granted, brain memoirs investi-
gate how mind, brain, body, and culture interact to create or perform 
selfhood, and that investigation has social, scientific, and philosophical 
implications. In fact, recent brain memoirs may have a thing or two to 
teach neuroscientists about the self, and they certainly have quite a bit 
to teach the rest of us about the functional and theoretical promises 
and limits of current brain research.
Most of the neurological narratives under discussion here take 
the form of the quest—for new knowledge, understanding, healing, 
adaptation, and for reconciliation between scientific theory, medical 
practice, and the lived experience of patients (and writers). Hustvedt, 
who wrote The Shaking Woman, and Shulman, author of To Love What 
Is, are novelists, so it’s no surprise that their accounts are highly 
literary in structure, care with language, allusions, and attention to 
matters of style and voice. at the same time, their aims are every 
bit as social and pedagogical as those of Dully in My Lobotomy and 
Taylor in My Stroke of Insight. all four writers recount their attempts 
to make sense of and to live with the profound changes to their lives 
that arise from disorders, injuries, and/or anomalies in the brain or 
the nervous system as a whole. 
To write My Lobotomy, Dully tracked down the files of his surgeon 
Walter Freeman with the help of co-writer Charles Fleming. “The great 
mystery of my life was inside,” he writes. “The question that haunted 
me for more than forty years was about to be answered” (x). according 
to the records, Dully’s stepmother lou fabricated a diagnostic history 
so that the stepson it seems she always hated would appear to be 
a candidate for Freeman’s transorbital lobotomy. as a result, Dully 
is haunted by the question of who he would have been if his brain 
175Jason Tougaw
had not been violated by the crude surgical procedure known as an 
“ice pick lobotomy.” He learns quite a bit from his file about exactly 
what happened and how. Toward the end of the book, he writes, 
“ever since my lobotomy I’ve felt like a freak—ashamed. But . . . I 
know that my suffering is over. I know my lobotomy didn’t touch 
my soul. For the first time, I feel no shame. I am, at last, at peace” 
(256). Dully seems to use soul as a synonym for self, and while his 
story is convincing on the grounds of the peace he has found and the 
shame he has overcome, it does not offer persuasive evidence that his 
self is untouched by the lobotomy. In that sense, the “great mystery” 
of his life remains, though he learns to live with it. 
Because Taylor is a brain anatomist, it may seem surprising that 
she is more pointedly concerned than Dully with the matters of the 
soul and self, or at least with spiritual dimensions of the self and their 
expression through the brain. Taylor awakens to “a sharp pain pierc-
ing [her] brain directly behind [her] left eye” and “stumble[s] into the 
world with the ambivalence of a wounded soldier” (37). Not yet fully 
conscious, she makes a characteristically idiosyncratic decision, to hop 
on her “cardio-glider” and start “jamming away to Shania Twain” (38). 
Then, it happened: “I felt a powerful and unusual sense of dissocia-
tion roll over me. I felt so peculiar that I questioned my well-being. 
even though my thoughts seemed lucid, my body felt irregular. as I 
watched my hands and arms rocking forward and back, forward and 
back, in opposing synchrony with my torso, I felt strangely detached 
from my normal cognitive functions. It was as if the integrity of my 
mind/body connection had somehow become compromised” (38). This 
detachment persists and increases. Taylor “felt bizarre, as if [her] con-
scious mind was suspended somewhere between [her] normal reality 
and some esoteric space” (38). She becomes increasingly interested in 
this esoteric space because it offers her a view of the world she hasn’t 
seen before. Her book is primarily about her changed relationship to 
her brain and the implications of that change with regard to how we 
understand reality. She wants others to see the world the way she 
does after her stroke. In her words, “one of the greatest blessings I 
received as a result of this hemorrhage is that I had the chance to 
rejuvenate and strengthen my neurocircuits of innocence and inner 
joy” (139). Taylor attributes her new understanding and emotional 
fulfillment to her stroke. 
In To Love What Is, Shulman offers a sharp and moving account 
of her search to learn how to live with her husband Scott after a 
brain injury that left his memory severely impaired, but other aspects 
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of his self intact. Shulman intercuts the story of Scott’s accident and 
the life it creates for the couple with flashbacks to the history of this 
unusual marriage. The two were high school sweethearts, separated for 
decades before uniting in mid-life to form an unexpected bond for two 
people whose lives had diverged pretty sharply. From the beginning, 
Shulman felt a strong admiration and attraction to Scott’s physicality, 
which she linked to his reserved, masculine, and trustworthy charac-
ter. Her account makes it clear that memory and identity are not the 
same thing. Memory gives us a sense of autobiography, provides an 
ongoing narrative for the self, but Shulman lives with a man whose 
reserve, masculinity, and compassion outlive his capacity to remember 
what he’s done, where he’s been, and who he knows. 
The quest Hustvedt recounts in The Shaking Woman, or a History 
of My Nerves is even more confounding (if slightly less alarming) than 
Dully’s, Shulman’s, or Taylor’s because Hustvedt’s symptoms are less 
clear-cut. Hustvedt is determined to find out what role her brain might 
play in her body’s startling behavior: the sudden onset of a condition 
that caused her to convulse when she spoke in public (which she did 
often). The first incident occurred at a memorial service for her father:
I looked out at the fifty or so friends and colleagues of my father’s 
who had gathered around the memorial Norway spruce, launched 
into my first sentence, and began to shudder violently from the 
neck down. My arms flapped. My knees knocked. I shook as if I 
were having a seizure. Weirdly, my voice wasn’t affected. It didn’t 
change at all. astounded by what was happening to me and ter-
rified that I would fall over, I managed to keep my balance and 
continue, despite the fact that the cards in my hands were flying 
back and forth in front of me. When the speech ended, the shak-
ing stopped. I looked down at my legs. They had turned a deep 
red with a bluish cast. (3)
With that glance at her deep red legs, Hustvedt begins her quest to 
understand what her body did that day—and on so many subsequent 
days when she spoke in public. as she writes, “I decided to go in 
search of the shaking woman” (7). 
In general, the quests these memoirs chronicle prompt their au-
thors to confront philosophical questions about the relationship between 
brain, body, self, and culture on just about every page. The insights 
they offer about these relationships, however, tend to be local and 
personal, rather than grand or totalizing.
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are You Your Brain?
While neuroscience has advanced rapidly in recent years, enabling 
recovery or therapy for many people suffering from brain injuries 
or disorders, the hype surrounding these advances has left most of 
their philosophical implications overlooked, underlooked, exaggerated, 
or distorted. early on, Jamison and Grandin described particular in-
carnations of a general problem confronted by philosophers of mind 
for centuries and, more recently, by neurobiologists and cognitive 
scientists: the impossibility of gaining first-hand knowledge of what 
neurobiologist antonio Damasio has called a “private, first-person 
phenomenon.”1 Damasio is describing a problem for philosophy and 
for empirical laboratory research. He and colleagues like Gerald edel-
man, Jaak Panksepp, and Mark Solms are busy devising methods for 
integrating the examination of subjective experience into brain research 
and theory. But there’s a lot they don’t know yet. If you listen to the 
hype—in the press and also in scientific publications—you might think 
philosophical questions about the relationship between a person’s body, 
brain, mind, and self have been cracked by laboratory science and that 
we are on the verge of understanding our biology so well that the 
philosophical questions have become quaint historical forerunners to 
the hard sciences rapidly rendering them moot. But the full complexity 
of the relationships between the body, the brain it contains, the mind 
generated by it, and the self that feels and acts in the world has not 
been revealed by fMRI or PeT scans. The nascent neuroscience of the 
self has generated many questions, much promising data, fluctuating 
diagnoses, and a host of fascinating (and sometimes almost fantasti-
cal) case histories, but its fledgling answers tend to be very local or 
highly theoretical.2
For decades, Damasio has been examining the experience of his 
patients through the lens of philosophical questions about conscious-
ness, emotion, and cognition. His newest book, Self Comes to Mind: 
Constructing the Conscious Brain (2010), is in many ways a cap and 
a reflection on his trilogy of bestsellers on the topic: Descartes’ Er-
ror: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (1994), The Feeling of What 
Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (1999), and 
Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Human Brain (2003). The titles 
of all these books reveal a bias toward thinking of the brain as the 
generator of self, and this bias is the focus of philosopher alva Noë’s 
critique of neuroscience in Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your 
Brain and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness (2010). Damasio’s 
178 BRaIN MeMoIRS, NeURoSCIeNCe, aND THe SelF
and Noë’s books represent the best of two camps in a debate that’s 
beginning to rage about neuroscience’s capacity to understand the 
self. Noë’s subtitle offers a preview of his arguments. He’s concerned 
about the neuroscience hype. He argues that consciousness is “more 
like dancing than it is like digestion” (xii). It is, he writes, “something 
we do or make. Better: it is something we achieve” (xii). He does not 
believe the feeling of being a living self can be explained “in neural 
terms alone” (xii). We are whole bodies. We are social organisms with 
life histories who occupy complex environments. Noë is convinced 
that the neuroscience hype has taken the brain out of its contexts 
and imagined it thriving in a vat—as in The Matrix or any number 
of philosophical thought experiments—to convince us that our brains 
contain the whole story of selfhood. 
Damasio may well be one of the culprits behind the hype Noë 
bemoans, though it’s difficult to know, because Noë doesn’t cite Dama-
sio’s growing number of books on the topic. Nor does Damasio address 
Noë’s critique directly in Self Comes to Mind. In this book, Damasio 
recapitulates his earlier theories even as he admits that he’s “grown 
dissatisfied with [his] account of the problem” of consciousness and 
that he’s changed his mind “on two issues in particular: the origin and 
nature of feelings and the mechanisms behind the construction of the 
self” (6). Damasio now believes that feelings are even more important 
to the generation of conscious experience than he thought previously 
and that neural mechanisms in the brain stem are more important in 
the process of producing these feelings. There is something rhetorically 
tricky about the assertion that Damasio has changed his mind because 
his argument confirms and elevates the status of mechanisms that have 
always been his favorite topics: feelings (as opposed to emotions), the 
proto-self (the brain’s preconscious “map” of the organism’s body, or 
“internal milieu”), and core consciousness (the feeling of being present 
and alive in an environment full of objects at any given moment) (18, 
42). He does, however, offer an additional category for consideration: 
primordial feelings, an organism’s barely or nearly felt sense of its 
body’s interior. although the outlines of his theory have not changed 
much, his hypotheses about the brain physiology that contributes to 
forming the self have evolved. 
In many ways Damasio’s and Noë’s books complement each 
other nicely. Damasio’s is full of concrete detail about physiology and 
clinical observations, examined and interpreted through the lens of 
philosophical questions that are sometimes addressed hastily. Noë is 
careful with his philosophical arguments, but as hasty with science as 
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Damasio is with philosophy. It’s unfortunate that these two thinkers 
do not address or cite each other and that they don’t find a middle 
ground in terms of methodology. If they did, their differences would 
likely be revealed as matters of emphasis and rhetoric more than belief 
or conviction. In fact, both writers are really asking, “What roles do 
our brains play in making us who we are?” and “How do particular 
brain functions, regions, and systems contribute to the shaping and 
development of identity, personality, and disposition?” These are more 
nuanced questions than “are you your brain?” Damasio, the neurolo-
gist, emphasizes physiology (the body as a whole, not just the brain). 
Noë, the philosopher, emphasizes the environmental and social contexts 
of an organism’s brain and body.
Brain memoirs are already asking the more nuanced questions. 
Nearly all of them are concerned with how our brains contribute to 
particular aspects of self in the context of a life and an environment. 
The experience of the memoirists, navigating science and medicine 
in order to craft lives (and books) that help them cope with their 
brains, leads to an organic acceptance that we do not know much 
about the relationship between brain and self. These books offer the 
theorists a lesson in humility: the neuroscience of the self should be 
approached only hypothetically, with an emphasis on the experiences 
of the organisms it studies. Too often, as Noë’s book makes clear, 
these questions are addressed prematurely and reductively, overlooking 
what we don’t know or pretending we know more than we do.3 For 
the memoirists, the questions, the hypothetical data, the fluctuating 
diagnoses, and the grand theories provide a new context in which to 
explore ancient questions about selfhood. Dully’s lobotomy, Hustvedt’s 
convulsions, Shulman’s husband’s accident, and Taylor’s stroke all 
prompt them to go searching for the relationship between the brain 
and the self—to seek understanding that will help them live with 
their altered circumstances. These writers, apropos of Noë, may not 
be their brains, but their brains shape their experiences in ways that 
are fundamental and undeniable.
How Do Brain Memoirists Understand the  
lived Relations between Brain and Self?
living with uncertainty is a fundamental theme in brain mem-
oirs, a theme about which the memoirists have something to teach 
the scientists who study brains and the doctors who treat them. It 
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seems inevitable that the writer’s lived experience will sometimes 
contradict the advice, doctrine, treatment, and data offered by profes-
sionals. The contradictions tend to bewilder patients, even those with 
the wherewithal to write memoirs at least partly designed to reveal 
the contradictions and improve the science of medicine in ways that 
will help future patients. 
Dully’s neurosurgeon, Dr. Walter Freeman, is the most egregious 
physician portrayed in any of these memoirs. He was an enthusiastic 
proponent of the transorbital lobotomy, a procedure so brutal it was 
sometimes performed with an ice pick. The results were highly variable, 
from death to miniscule changes in behavior. Freeman’s notes about 
Dully are detailed and frank, so much that they reveal his stepmother 
lou’s manipulation of his “symptoms” and Freeman’s doubts about 
his young patient’s candidacy and his outcome. He learns that lou 
visited six psychiatrists before finding Freeman; four of these diagnosed 
her as the problem. He learns that Freeman was concerned about his 
professional status and that his lobotomies had already fallen out of 
favor by the time he treated Dully. In short, he learns quite a bit, 
but he does not get his central question answered. He does not learn 
who he’d have been with a different brain. He doesn’t even learn 
how dramatically his brain may have been altered. at this stage in 
medical history, nobody can tell him that. 
The discoveries Siri Hustvedt makes in The Shaking Woman are 
also about adaptation and living with uncertainty more than with 
hard facts or cures. When Hustvedt goes looking for the woman who 
shakes, she consults neurologists and psychiatrists, reads philosophy 
and the history of medicine, and seeks to understand the relationship 
between mind and body by looking at fMRI images of her brain and 
practicing biofeedback techniques. In the process, she manages to make 
philosophy, neurology, and history seem like the stuff of mystery novels. 
Her book is a page-turner. as in so many brain memoirs, Hustvedt’s 
physicians are flummoxed. They disagree with and contradict each 
other. Some offer answers that seem too easy; others deny the real-
ity of her experience altogether. Finally, she gets a drug in place of 
a diagnosis. Neurology, psychology, and psychoanalysis can’t explain 
why Hustvedt shakes, but Propanolol (or the placebo effect) forestalls 
the shaking. The chemistry of the shaking woman’s brain is at play 
in making her who she is, but how and why remain vague.
In the absence of answers, Hustvedt finds intellectual stimulation 
and emotional solace in the philosophical implications of contemporary 
neuroscience. Her reading ranges freely over William James and antonio 
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Damasio, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jaak Pansksepp. The arc of her 
narrative traces the development of her relationship to the shaking. 
early on, she describes her condition almost as a visitation: “It ap-
peared that some unknown force had suddenly taken over my body 
and decided I needed a good, sustained jolting” (4). Sentiments like 
this are common in autobiographical works about the brain, which tend 
to suggest an implicit, though unstable, dualism. They characterize the 
brain as an entity or force that is both part of and separate from the 
self or organism writing the story. Illness tends to throw this unstable 
dualism into relief, to make apparent a kind of alienation between 
brain and self that haunts everyday life. In Hustvedt’s words, “every 
sickness has an alien quality, a feeling of invasion and loss of control 
that is evident in the language we use about it” (6). The condition 
feels alien partly because its onset is so sudden and partly because 
it seems willful. But the will in question doesn’t feel like her own 
conscious will. If Hustvedt were writing in the nineteenth century, or 
if she were a devout Christian, she might see this will as either divine 
or evil. From Hustvedt’s secular position, it seems as though there 
is a hidden force with a will of its own somewhere inside her body 
or brain. a friend who witnesses one of her episodes reinforces the 
split when she tells Hustvedt, “it [was] like watching a doctor and a 
patient in the same body” (30). In fact, Hustvedt takes on this dual 
role as doctor and patient, taking a far more active role in her search 
for a diagnosis than the medical establishment generally encourages 
or even allows. 
Toward the end of the book, still without a firm diagnosis, 
Hustvedt asks, “Can I say that the shaking woman is a repeatedly 
activated pattern of firing neurons and stress hormones released in 
an involuntary response, which is then dampened as I keep my cool, 
continue to talk, convinced that I’m not really in any danger? Is that 
all there is to the story?” (116). If the answers to these questions are 
yes, then the origins of the shaking are beyond the will, arising from 
the body’s ongoing, involuntary processes that maintain homeostasis 
and keep our systems operating. Keeping her cool, however, is a 
willful act whereby Hustvedt dampens the impulse to resist or fight 
what’s happening to her. It feels to her as if keeping her cool may 
have a therapeutic effect, somehow shifting the neuronal and hormonal 
patterns that drive her body to convulse, her arms to flail, and her 
legs to turn a deep red. Hustvedt is speculating here. Her “cool” is 
not a medically recognized treatment. But it is one of the keys to 
the philosophical questions her book explores, questions about how 
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the conscious and the unconscious impinge on each other as they 
respond to objects in an organism’s world—and how a sense of self 
is produced in the process.
Damasio could almost be describing Hustvedt’s relationship to her 
shaking body when he argues that we must understand two integrated 
aspects of self in order to understand biology’s role in the formation 
of identity. He calls these the “self-as-object” and the “self-as-subject” 
(8, 9). The shaking woman is Hustvedt’s object self; the tireless diag-
nostician is her subject self. according to Damasio, the object self is 
“a dynamic collection of integrated neural processes, centered on the 
representation of the living body, that finds expression in a dynamic 
collection of integrated mental processes” (9). By contrast, “the self-as-
subject, as knower, as the ‘I’, is a more elusive presence” (9). In other 
words, research is beginning to reveal how the brain maps the body, 
making an “object self” out of it, for the purpose of maintaining the 
preconscious activities necessary for a body to live. 
The subject self is another issue, however. In biological terms, 
the subject self is “dispersed,” meaning that it involves a vast array 
of brain processes, cognitive traits, and mental functions: perception, 
memory, thought, emotion, etc. (9). Brain research is not currently in 
a position to imagine offering an account of the physiology involved 
in Hustvedt’s evolving feelings and knowledge about her condition, 
not to mention the ways that condition changes her sense of self as 
she evolves into “the shaking woman.” Damasio would like his read-
ers to “imagine that the self-as-subject-and-knower is stacked, so to 
speak, on top of the self-as-object, as an additional layer of neural 
processes that gives rise to yet another layer of mental processing” 
(9–10) This layering, he says, reveals that “there is no dichotomy be-
tween self-as-object and self-as-knower; there is, rather, a continuity 
and progression” (10). So the shaking someone may be a product of 
what Damasio calls stacking, but of course that’s a metaphor, not a 
concrete description of physiology. often, metaphors mask the limits 
of knowledge in science. a memoir like Hustvedt’s challenges brain 
science to acknowledge its current limitations. like enlightenment sci-
ence, today’s neuroscience sometimes represents itself on the verge of 
offering the key to all knowledge—something like Causabon’s “Key 
to all Mythologies” in George eliot’s Middlemarch. But if neither the 
practitioners nor the theorists can explain Hustvedt’s shaking or tell 
Dully just how his transorbital lobotomy changed his personality, then 
those keys are far from unlocking the answers philosophers have been 
seeking for millennia. 
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Noë, the philosopher, offers a different window onto Hustvedt’s 
shaking and Dully’s lobotomy. He proposes “that the brain’s job is that 
of facilitating a dynamic pattern of interaction among brain, body, and 
world. experience is enacted by conscious beings with the help of the 
world” (47). The implication is that we should take Hustvedt’s grief 
(and the collective grief of the audience for her eulogy) and the rage 
in Dully’s family (and the abuse it suggests) more seriously as actors 
in the making of these writers’ suffering and searching selves. It seems 
to me that Damasio believes something very similar, but Noë is mak-
ing the point that emphasis matters. It’s fine for Damasio to believe 
that body and world are integral to the making of consciousness, but 
if he spends hundreds of pages on neural mechanisms and just a few 
paragraphs on the objects that comprise an organism’s world, he con-
tributes to the misleading hype that we are our brains, end of story. 
Disciplinary divides and rhetoric conceal underlying agreements about 
brain, body, self, and culture—agreements that might offer memoirists 
like Hustvedt and Dully more insight, more effective treatments, and 
more humane medical practices if they were to become the focus of 
the theorists’ work.
Because no general theory can encompass the particular experi-
ence of an individual, brain memoirists have to find a narrative form 
that can capture and sustain the complexities of the questions gener-
ated by brain anomalies whose symptoms alter identity. Shulman’s To 
Love What Is, the testimony of a caretaker rather than a patient, is an 
illuminating example of the necessity of devising a form to meet the 
demands of the problem at hand. Her narrative is layered, with alter-
nating descriptions of a youthful fling, a midlife reunion and enduring 
commitment, Scott’s devastating accident, and after that, the couple’s 
learning how to live and love in his eternal present. The layers give 
the voice a developmental quality. The naive young lover becomes the 
outspoken feminist novelist who becomes the philosophically-minded 
caretaker determined to protect her own fierce independence and 
Scott’s quality of life. The book is tough and tender. It is wise in its 
response to what many would call tragedy and brilliant in its ability 
to sift through the uncertain knowledge of brain science to develop a 
set of strategies tailored to living with, rather than diagnosing, Scott’s 
damaged brain.
Shulman isn’t suggesting that Scott’s injury hasn’t changed him, 
just that it hasn’t changed him entirely. The degree to which he’s 
changed varies from day to day, hour to hour, and sometimes minute 
to minute. Shortly after the accident, he exhibits what is to be the 
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most uncharacteristic behavior that will become, off and on, a new 
dimension of his personality:
The dignified, courtly man I love has emerged from his enforced 
silence a loquacious stranger—sometimes a clown, full of wild 
flights of wordplay that keep Heather and Norm and me howling 
with laughter, sometimes a garrulous, nonsensical, even dirty old 
man hitting on the nurses. Fluent aphasia is the name the doctors 
give to this uncontrollable verbal pandemonium, a result of dam-
age to the brain’s speech centers, by which, in place of the elusive, 
sought-after words, the lips spew forth a circuitous approximation 
that usually sounds like babble but sometimes hints at wisdom. are 
the myriad substitute words arbitrary or telling? Since aphasia, of 
both the fluent and non-fluent varieties, is caused by bodily injury 
or disease and often disappears with time, it would seem purely 
physical, not psychological. Yet overlaying my modest husband there 
appears to be another man with multiple alien personalities—now 
outgoing and entertaining, now authoritative and managerial—and 
all of them named Scott York. Can his injury have transformed his 
very self, stricken deep into his identity? or revealed a buried self 
I never knew? (33)
Shulman tells us what can be known—that aphasia is associated with 
damage to “the brain’s speech centers.” But from there, she offers ques-
tions that cannot be answered with what is known about the brain 
mechanisms involved with language. like so many brain memoirists, 
Shulman offers narrative in the absence of answers.
Toward the end of the book, Shulman describes a calculated risk 
she decided to take: accepting an offer from friends Heather and Norm 
to accompany them on a trip to Tuscany. at first, Scott is disoriented, 
asking repeatedly if they are in “The real Italy? The real Tuscany?” 
When they arrive at their villa, where the driveway is lined with 
blooming acacia trees, Scott’s perspective shifts: “‘Will you just look 
at that yellow!’ cries Scott. . . . He grins with incredulous joy. Begin-
ning with the Cleveland arboretum, where he first kissed me in 1950 
beneath the spreading branches of that ohio buckeye, and on to the 
renowned botanical gardens of Miami, Sydney, Honolulu, Tucson, and 
Brooklyn . . . to the famous bo trees and banyans of India, Scott and 
I, ardent arbor enthusiasts, have basked in and under distinguished 
trees” (135).
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Scott’s response to the acacia trees, like so many of his sensory 
responses, is inflected with emotions both familiar and characteristic 
from the time before his accident. Upon their return from New York, 
Scott tells his wife that they “forgot to bring something home from 
Tuscany.” When she asks him what that is, he responds, “a yellow 
tree!” (138). Shulman’s risk has paid off. She has given Scott an experi-
ence that becomes a new memory, even if it’s a halting and unstable 
one. Scott doesn’t recover substantially more than this; in fact, over 
time, his memory and health decline. But he does make some suc-
cessful art; he does express love and rage, disappointment and joy. 
Shulman follows the narration of the Tuscany trip with some 
reflections on the science of memory. “little is known,” she writes, 
“about the way information in your short term memory . . . is 
converted into long-term memory for retrieval whenever you want 
it” (139). She goes on to explain the well-accepted hypotheses that 
emotion is crucial to the conversion; that the hippocampi, “important 
structures deep inside the temporal lobes,” are crucial to the process; 
that “experiments on slugs, rats, and monkeys . . . have established 
connections between memory retention and, variously, a certain gene, 
a particular enzyme, ReM sleep patterns, a molecular pathway, a 
habit state” (140). Ultimately, though, these are fragments of a process 
that still eludes science. In Shulman’s words, again, “how memories 
are actually laid down and stored in the brain—what the process of 
becoming electrochemically hardwired consists of—remains a mystery” 
(140). There is no doubt that memory is crucial to the creation of the 
fully realized autobiographical selves most of us take for granted. 
There is little doubt that the experiments Shulman lists have identi-
fied fundamental aspects of the process by which long-term memory 
enables us to experience autobiographical selves. But Scott’s accident 
puts Shulman in the position of experiencing, day-to-day, that memory 
is not all there is to identity. 
In My Stroke of Insight, Taylor comes to understand her own 
identity as an organism to be a multifarious enterprise that sounds a 
lot like Damasio’s “dispersed” self (9): “I still experience the collective 
of myself as a single entity with a single mind. I do believe that the 
consciousness we exhibit is the collective consciousness of whatever 
cells are functioning, and that both of our hemispheres complement 
one another as they create a single seamless perception of the world” 
(137). Without attempting a comprehensive theory, Taylor suggests that 
the cellular self is a local expression of a metaphysical reality. With 
her interest in esoteric aspects of consciousness, Taylor verges on the 
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mystical much more than Hustvedt, Shulman, or Dully.4 In her account 
of her stroke, this interest only intensifies as the symptoms become 
more severe, until she finally loses consciousness and with it the abil-
ity to reflect. She notices that her movements “are no longer fluid,” 
that they are “jerky”; she gains an awareness of “automatic body 
responses”; she feels “momentarily privy to a precise and experiential 
understanding of how hard the fifty trillion cells in [her] brain and 
body were working in perfect unison to maintain the flexibility and 
integrity of [her] physical form” (39); she showers and reels from the 
“roar of the water” (40); she feels increasingly isolated, losing aware-
ness of “the sensations outside of [her]” (41). The more disoriented 
she becomes, the more she feels a “growing sense of peace” (41). Her 
amygdala, she surmises, had not “reacted with alarm” (41), and she 
feels fortunate about this. She loses awareness of physical reality, even 
as she tries to dial her phone for help. But her sheer interest in her 
experience outweighs alarm. Taylor “felt truly at one with [her] body 
as a complex construction of living, thriving organisms” (43). 
Two aspects of this observation are particularly striking. First, 
the optimism that makes Taylor’s book distinctive—and probably also 
what helped her publisher gain the self-help market. She’s had a stroke 
and she’s happy about the insight she’s gained from the experience. 
Second, her use of the plural to describe herself, as a conglomerate 
of “living, thriving organisms” contains a hidden thesis. It would be 
easy to celebrate Taylor’s optimism and stop there, but her argument 
about the plurality of organisms and systems that make us feel like 
singular, unified selves is just as significant. Her book is explicitly 
pedagogical, as was the talk she gave at the TeD conference when 
she first broke her story, a talk that went viral, led to Taylor’s minor 
celebrity, and played no small part in her book contract. While her 
upbeat response to her stroke has received a great deal of attention, 
her more philosophical point about the neurology of self threatens to 
go unnoticed.5
The neurological experience that motivates brain memoirists to 
write ensures that they cannot take selfhood for granted, just as the 
research of a neuroscientist or philosopher of mind cannot. as a result, 
the memoirists and the theorists draw some consistent conclusions, many 
of which run against the grain of widespread cultural assumptions 
and of popular accounts of brain research. The self, they suggest, is 
by no means a single entity. It’s an experience of unity that emerges 
from conglomerates of neurological, physiological, mental, familial, and 
social elements. The complexity of this conglomerate is humbling and 
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awe-inspiring. While hasty or reductive claims that we’re on the brink 
of understanding how the brain generates selfhood abound, the real 
implication of the last few decades of brain research is the spectacular 
complexity of the brain’s collaborative role in generating self.
Writing and the Making of Self
In his essay “The Stream of Consciousness,” William James ar-
gues that “the object before the mind always has a ‘Fringe’.”6 In other 
words, we are conscious of the objects we’re paying attention to—for 
these memoirists, the relations between their brains, bodies, selves, and 
worlds—but our minds also vaguely sense meanings and associations 
of which we’re not quite conscious. Writing, these memoirists suggest, 
shifts this fringe into the center of attention. Through the process of 
putting words to page, we become conscious of what we didn’t quite 
know beforehand. James argues that “a good third of psychic life 
consists in these rapid premonitory perspective views of schemes of 
thought not yet articulate.”7 The writing of a brain memoir could be 
seen as an exercise in premonitory thinking, living, and being, ushering 
not quite felt aspects of bodily experience into awareness. 
of course, as James also notes, the making of art is a selec-
tive process. even artists whose intention is to represent something 
like James’s fringe—the surrealists, for example—do so by a careful 
process of selection and arrangement of the tools of their medium. In 
James’s words, “The artist notoriously selects his items, rejecting all 
tones, colors, shapes, which do not harmonize with each other and 
with the main purpose of his work. That unity, harmony, ‘convergence 
of characters,’ . . . is wholly due to elimination. any natural subject 
will do, if the artist has wit enough to pounce upon some one fea-
ture of it as characteristic, and suppress all merely accidental items 
which do not harmonize with this.”8 It’s remarkable how often brain 
memoirists articulate these two elements of composition—bringing the 
fringe into awareness and synthesizing new thoughts—as fundamental 
to integrating their changed neurological experience into their sense 
of their own identities. Shulman “hadn’t expected to write about so 
private and raw a subject” (115) but decided to do so because “there 
was the possibility that writing about it could help me understand it” 
(116). She writes her way through a quest to learn to live with her 
husband Scott in the continuous present his damaged memory creates 
for him. Hustvedt articulates the daily process of writing as a vehicle 
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for synthesizing her sense of self with the “alien” force in her body 
that makes her shake (6). Dully comes to peace with his lobotomy by 
way of his research and writing. Through writing about her stroke, 
Taylor comes to the conclusion that “this story-teller portion of our 
left mind’s language center is specifically designed to make sense of 
the world outside us, based on minimal amounts of information” (143). 
Taylor finds her own hasty “left mind” conclusions “comical” at first, 
but she comes to a realization that speaks to the role of writing and 
the evolution of identity dramatized in many brain memoirs: “It has 
been extremely important that I retain the understanding that my left 
brain is doing the best job it can with the information it has to work 
with. I need to remember, however, that there are enormous gaps be-
tween what I know and what I think I know. I learned that I need to 
be very wary of my story-teller’s potential for stirring up drama and 
trauma” (144). The gap between “what I know” and “what I think I 
know” is vivid in all these brain memoirs. In addition to offering the 
rest of us some lessons about living with uncertainty, this gap—which 
sounds a lot like James’s fringe—signals the potential for writing to 
mediate the accidents and agency involved in the making of identity. 
Shulman describes the process of writing as mediation with 
characteristic grace: “So it happens that at nine o’clock each morning 
I banish the real Scott in order to entertain the virtual one, who stays 
with me on the page until two, when the real one opens our door, 
exclaiming, ‘look who it is! It’s my beautiful wife!’ and hugs me 
like a returning warrior” (116). Her juxtaposition of “the real Scott” 
and “the virtual one” is incisive: it speaks to how memoir might 
generate agency. By creating a virtual portrait of Scott, a companion 
to the self-portrait that emerges from Shulman’s compassionate and 
articulate voice, she recreates the life with which she and Scott are 
struggling. In the process, she reorients herself in relation to that life. 
“Writing,” she continues, “takes me out of my sometimes beleaguered 
self into the trancelike realm of alpha waves, where, like Scott, I live 
in the moment” (165). The act of writing and the habits of mind it 
requires shape Shulman’s consciousness profoundly. She describes her 
time in the “alpha waves” as a therapeutic practice that enables her 
to live: “With five focused hours a day of aesthetic relief, I have my 
life again, with enough satisfaction to carry me through the entire 
day, and in the evenings back to the world, no longer alien” (165). 
The word “trancelike” suggests a liminal state between the conscious 
and the unconscious, one that, like dreams, promises to put the two 
aspects of mind into closer contact than they are under ordinary cir-
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cumstances. The phrase “in the moment” suggests that writing involves 
the suspension of full-scale autobiographical awareness in favor of 
what Damasio calls alternately “core consciousness” and “core self,” 
whereby an organism interacts with—and is changed by—the objects 
perceived in its immediate environment. The ironies here are produc-
tive: to achieve agency through writing, Shulman suspends conscious 
intention; to reflect on the story of her life with Scott, she suspends 
autobiographical awareness.
analogously, Hustvedt becomes the shaking woman through 
writing: she articulates the daily process of writing as a vehicle for 
synthesizing her sense of self with the “alien” force in her body that 
makes her shake. “[W]hen I’m writing,” she says, “much is generated 
unconsciously”: 
I feel beneath my words a preconscious world from which I draw 
them, thoughts not yet articulated but potentially there, and when 
I find them, I believe in their rightness or wrongness. Yes, that’s 
what I wanted to say. against what do I measure this? It is not 
outside me. I don’t have some externalized notion of the perfect 
sentence that best expresses what I want to say. The knowledge 
lives inside me, and yet, isn’t that verbal interior made from the 
exterior, from all the books I’ve read, the conversations I’ve had 
and their mnemic traces? (88)
again, the preconscious world Hustvedt relies on—which she calls 
“that half-remembered underground” (88)—sounds an awful lot like 
James’s fringe. like Shulman, she draws on what’s unconscious to craft 
a sense of control—or agency—through writing. She understands that 
“the exterior” is part of the equation, too, the social forces shaping her 
internal sense of self: “all the books [she’s] read, the conversations [she’s] 
had” (88). and she makes it clear that the elimination and selection 
James recognizes as fundamental to the process of turning perceptual 
objects into art are integral to the process of using words to mediate 
the relationship between accident and agency. Writing foregrounds the 
dynamic interplay between fringe and intention, and this is why the 
brain memoir can be such a powerful tool for people forced by neu-
rological circumstances into crafting an identity. Through writing they 
find ways to accommodate changes in their brains and bodies that can’t 
be ignored. The memoir is a chronicle of the intricate entanglements 
of brain, body, self, and world that are so complex they defy the most 
advanced technologies of neuroscience and our cognitive capacities. If 
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brain memoirs have a thesis, it’s this: the complicated interconnections 
of brain, body, self, and world require us to learn how to think, how 
to conduct research, how to write, and how to live in the world of 
Taylor’s gaps, Shulman’s alpha waves, Hustvedt’s “half-remembered 
underground,” James’s fringe. These writers are organisms who have 
learned the wisdom of epistemological humility by making their brains 
and bodies the objects of their narrative attention.
NoTeS
1. Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, 12. 
2. an extensive body of literature on the neurology of the self has emerged 
in recent years. In addition to the work of Damasio and Noë, some of the most 
influential of these texts include: ansermet and Magistretti, The Biology of Freedom; 
Broks, Into the Silent Land; edelman, Wider than the Sky; edelman and Tononi, A 
Universe of Consciousness; Gazzaniga, Human; Keenan, The Face in the Mirror; leDoux, 
The Synaptic Self; Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience; Ramachandran, The Tell-Tale Brain; 
Ramachandran and Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain; and Solms and Turnbull, The 
Brain and the Inner World. 
3. There is a growing critique of this neuroscientific reductivism emerging 
from the social sciences. The following are among the strongest of these critiques: 
Johnson, “‘How Do You Know Unless You look?’: Brain Imaging, Biopower, and 
Practical Neuroscience”; Jordan-Young, Brain Storm: The Flaws in the Science of Sex 
Research; Martin, “Mind-Body Problems”; Pitts-Taylor, “Social Brains, embodiment, 
and Neurointeractionism”; and, from within the sciences, Roy, “asking Different 
Questions: Feminist Practices for the Natural Sciences.” 
4. In that sense, her perspective resounds with William James’s lectures “on 
Mysticism,” from Varieties of Religious Experience, where he insists that subjective ac-
counts of mystical experience needed to be taken seriously on their own terms, and 
with the work of proponents of drug-induced psychedelic experience like aldous 
Huxley, Timothy leary, and (more recently) Daniel Pinchbeck.
5. To view Taylor’s TeD talk, see http://www.ted.com/talks/jill_bolte_taylor_s_
powerful_stroke_of_insight.html 
6. James, “The Stream of Consciousness,” 30.
7. Ibid., 31.
8. Ibid., 40.
aDDITIoNal ReCoMMeNDeD BRaIN MeMoIRS
Patrick Cockburn and Henry Cockburn. Henry’s Demons: Living with Schizophrenia, 
a Father and Son’s Story. New York: Scribner, 2011.
alice Weaver Flaherty. The Midnight Disease: The Drive to Write, Writer’s Block, and 
the Creative Brain. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2004.
Temple Grandin. Thinking in Pictures: My Life with Autism, expanded edition. New 
York: Vintage, 2010.
lynn Greenberg. The Body Broken: A Memoir. New York: Random House, 2009.
Kay Redfield Jamison. An Unquiet Mind: A Memoir of Moods and Madness. New 
York: Vintage, 1997.
191Jason Tougaw
Heather Sellers. You Don’t Look Like Anyone I Know: A True Story of Family, Face-
blindness, and Forgiveness. New York: Riverhead Books, 2010.
Daniel Tammet. Born on a Blue Day: A Memoir. New York: Free Press, 2007.
Melanie Thernstrom. The Pain Chronicles: Cures, Myths, Mysteries, Prayers, Diaries, 
Brain Scans, Healing, and the Science of Suffering. New York: Farrar, Strauss 
& Giroux, 2010.
Mark Vonnegut. Just Like Someone with Mental Illness Only More So: A Memoir. New 
York: Delacorte Press, 2010. 
BIBlIoGRaPHY
ansermet, Francois and Pierre Magistretti. The Biology of Freedom: Neural Plasticity, 
Experience, and the Unconscious. Translated by Susan Fairfield. New York: 
other Press, 2007. 
B., David. Epileptic. New York: Pantheon, 2006.
Bayley, John. Elegy for Iris. New York: Picador, 1999.
Bauby, Jean-Dominique. The Diving Bell and the Butterfly. Translated by Jeremy leg-
gatt. New York: Vintage, 1998.
Broks, Paul. Into the Silent Land: Travels in Neuropsychology. New York: atlantic 
Monthly Press, 2004.
Clegg, Bill. Portrait of an Addict as a Young Man. New York: little Brown and 
Company, 2010.
Damasio, antonio. Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: 
Penguin, 2005.
———. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. 
New York: Mariner Books, 2000.
———. Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain. New York: Mariner 
Books, 2003.
elliot, Stephen. The Adderall Diaries. New York: Graywolf Press, 2009.
edelman, Gerald M. Wider than the Sky: The Phenomenal Gift of Consciousness. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
edelman, Gerald M. and Guilio Tononi. A Universe of Consciousness: How Matter 
Becomes Imagination. New York: Basic Books, 2001.
eliot, George. Middlemarch. edited by Bert G. Hornbach. New York: Norton, 1977.
Franzen, Jonathan. “My Father’s Brain.” The New Yorker. September 10, 2001, 80–91.
Gazzaniga, Michael. Human: The Science Behind What Makes Us Human. New York: 
Harper Perennial, 2009.
Grandin, Temple. Thinking in Pictures: My Life with Autism, exp. edition. New York: 
Vintage, 2010.
Grandin, Temple and Margaret M. Scariano. Emergence: Labeled Autistic. Novato, 
Ca: Warner Books, 1986.
Hofstadter, Douglas. I Am a Strange Loop. New York: Basic Books, 2008.
Huxley, aldous. The Doors of Perception. New York: Harper Perennial, 2009.
James, William. “The Stream of Consciousness.” In Psychology: The Briefer Course. 
Mineola, NY: Dover Books, 2001: 18–42. 
———. Varieties of Religious Experience. In Writings: 1902–1910. New York: library 
of america, 1988: 1–478.
Kay Redfield Jamison. An Unquiet Mind: A Memoir of Moods and Madness. New 
York: Vintage, 1997.
Johnson, Davi. “‘How Do You Know Unless You look?’: Brain Imaging, Biopower, 
and Practical Neuroscience.” Journal of Medical Humanities 29, no. 33 (2008): 
147–161.
192 BRaIN MeMoIRS, NeURoSCIeNCe, aND THe SelF
Johnson, Steven. Mind Wide Open: Your Brain and the Neuroscience of Everyday Life. 
New York: Scribner, 2005.
Jordan-Young, Rebecca M. Brain Storm: The Flaws in the Science of Sex Research. 
Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 2010.
Keenan, Julian. The Face in the Mirror: The Origins of Consciousness. New York: 
Harper Collins, 2003.
Knapp, Caroline. Drinking: A Love Story. New York: Dial Press, 1997.
leary, Timothy. The Psychedelic Experience: A Manual Based on the Tibetan Book of the 
Dead. New York: Citadel Press, 1992.
leDoux, Joseph. The Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are. New York: 
Penguin, 2003.
Martin, emily. “Mind-Body Problems.” American Ethnologist 27, no. 3 (august 2000): 
569–590.
Nagel, Thomas. “What Is It like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 
(october 1974): 435–450.
Page, Tim. Parallel Play: Growing Up with Undiagnosed Asperger’s. New York: Double-
day, 2009.
Panksepp, Jaak. Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions. 
New York: oxford University Press, 1998.
Pinchbeck, Daniel. Breaking Open the Head: A Psychedelic Journey into the Heart of 
Contemporary Shamanism. New York: Broadway Books, 2003.
Pitts-Taylor, Victoria. “Social Brains, embodiment, and Neurointeractionism.” 
Forthcoming in The Body Handbook, edited by Bryan S. Turner. New York: 
Routledge, 2012.
Ramachandran, V. S. The Tell-Tale Brain: A Neuroscientist’s Quest for What Makes Us 
Human. New York: Norton, 2011.
Ramachandran, V. S. and Sandra Blakeslee. Phantoms in the Brain: Probing the Mys-
teries of the Human Mind. New York: Harper Perennial, 1999.
Roy, Deboleena. “asking Different Questions: Feminist Practices for the Natural 
Sciences.” Hypatia 23, no. 4 (November 2008): 135–157. 
Sacks, oliver. The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat: And Other Clinical Tales. 
1985. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998. 
Slater, lauren. Lying: A Metaphorical Memoir. New York: Penguin, 2001.
———. Prozac Diary. New York: Penguin, 1999. 
Solms, Mark and oliver Turnbull. The Brain and the Inner World: An Introduction to 
the Neuroscience of Subjective Experience. New York: other Books, 2003.
Daniel Tammet. Born on a Blue Day: A Memoir. New York: Free Press, 2007.
Taylor, Jill Bolte. “Stroke of Insight.” TED: Ideas Worth Spreading. March, 2008. 
http://www.ted.com/talks/jill_bolte_taylor_s_powerful_stroke_of_insight.html 
(accessed January 26, 2012).
Wurtzel, elizabeth. More, Now, Again: A Memoir of Addiction. New York: Scribner, 2002.
